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There is little doubt that, today, most disciplines are increasingly attentive to ethical 
questions, but it is in biology and medicine that this phenomenon has become most evident. A 
new discipline, bioethics, has been conceived in order to face the troublesome questions raised 
by recent developments in bio-medical sciences. In a matter of a few decades, an increasing 
number of research centers specialized in bioethics or mainly oriented towards bioethical 
questions have been created. At the same time, a number of analyses concerning previously 
unsuspected bioethical problems have been discussed in specialized conferences and diffused in 
media of every stripe.  
 
When considering this phenomenon, one might wonder whether a parallel development in 
architecture should be expected. Why have we not witnessed the birth and rapid development of 
a new "archit-ethics" devoted to the analysis and discussion of ethical problems raised by 
architecture? After all, an increasing number of architects and theoreticians of architecture have 
convincingly drawn attention to the ethical dimensions of their art. One might think that the 
absence of such a development is due to the fact that architecture is an art rather than a science, 
the former being, by its very nature, committed to aesthetical rather than ethical values, as was 
repeatedly claimed by the advocates of art for art's sake. However, whether or not we agree with 
the latter doctrine, this would be to forget that architecture is very different from other arts, since 
its function is to create places and contexts in which social life goes on. Architect's works have 
such an impact on the way people behave that the development of a new field devoted to the 
analysis of problems associated with this impact does not appear implausible. 
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Internal and external ethical problems 
 
The true reason why there is not an archit-ethics on the horizon is that ethical problems 
raised by architecture are of a very different nature than those raised by biomedical sciences and 
by most applied sciences. Whereas the latter are clearly external to the discipline which have 
generated them, the former remains internal to it. Let me illustrate what I mean by this 
distinction. The development of biomedical sciences have generated unsettling ethical problems 
by offering to humanity the possibility of making new choices that may have a considerable and 
even terrifying impact on its destiny. Thanks to these sciences, it has become possible to control 
the number of births and the moment of death, to determine the sex and traits of future children, 
to clone animals or even human beings, to use DNA tests in such a way that has enabled the 
State to increase its control over citizens and citizens to engage in otherwise unimaginable 
proceedings concerning parenthood, etc. Suppose now that an esteemed scientist involved in 
biomedical discoveries acknowledges his (or her) total incompetence in solving the ethical 
problems raised by such discoveries. In this situation, the scientist's scientific credibility would 
remain absolutely unaffected by such an acknowledgement. Such ethical questions simply do not 
figure into the practice of biology or medicine. They are of concern to jurists, philosophers, 
theologians, sociologists, politicians, columnists and simple citizens, but not to biologists as 
such. If the latter get involved in such debates, it is in order to provide, rather than solutions, 
technical expertise in regards to the scientific sources of ethical problems. Thus, such ethical 
problems are totally external to biomedical sciences. Moreover, the questions they raise are, to a 
large extent, new questions, even for those who have traditionally concerned themselves with 
ethics. Therefore, the idea that new interdisciplinary centers devoted to analyzing such questions 
with only ancillary participation on the part of biologists and physicians seems quite appropriate.  
 
In contrast, let us consider a somewhat parallel situation in architecture. It is true that, by 
their very activity, architects are responsible for the existence of buildings that affect 
considerably the lives of their users and inhabitants. One could even argue that this impact is 
more important than that resulting from biomedical discoveries because it continuously affects 
the life of each citizen. The decision to build giant habitation units rather than family-oriented 
cottages, the decision to make use of (or not to make use of) traditional ornamentation and/or 
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unexpected attractive spaces in order to neutralize the dullness of low-cost housing, the decision 
to provide for community gathering and communication in a building or urbanistic scheme, the 
decision to organize schools in a way that contributes to children's socialization in a climate of 
self-confidence, the decision to build hospitals in a way that creates hope in the lives of patients 
faced with death, the decision to plan prisons in a way that reduces prisoners' violent 
compulsions,  etc., all such decisions have considerable impact on people's lives. Since they 
affect ways of life and corresponding values, determining which decision is appropriate in all 
such cases is clearly an ethical problem. But suppose now that an esteemed architect whose work 
involved the type of decisions described above candidly acknowledges his (or her) total 
incompetence in solving such ethical questions. In this case, this architect's credibility is likely to 
be dramatically affected. Architects who are not concerned with the best ways to improve the 
lives of their building's users or inhabitants are very poor architects indeed! Architecture 
continuously raises ethical problems, which however are nothing more than normal problems 
that architects must solve in practicing their art. It is for this reason that these ethical problems 
can be called internal to their discipline.  
 
It is interesting to note that, if understood in the sense that I propose here, confronting 
internal ethical problems is almost a peculiarity of architecture as well as of urbanism, which 
may be considered as an extension of architecture to urban contexts. What I mean is that the bulk 
of ethical debates raised by architecture concerns problems which are so intrinsically linked with 
the very practice of architecture that architects can hardly dissociate the success of their work 
from the solution they bring to those problems; they can hardly be praised for their achievements 
and leave to the rest of society, as biologists typically do, the responsibility of finding solutions 
to the problems raised by their activity. Therefore, while I do not claim that architecture could 
not raise external ethical problems  an example might be the eventual ethical problems 
associated with certain kinds of legal servitude that most architects would be all too happy to 
pass on to jurists    I observe that these relatively rare examples are far from being 
representative of the problems encountered in the usual discussions about ethics and architecture. 
 
But what about other disciplines? Let us first consider the case of science and technology. 
It is not usual for scientists in their laboratories to be directly concerned with ethical questions. 
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Science is oriented towards truth or, if one prefers, towards the accumulation of reliable and 
objective knowledge. Were scientists to let ethical considerations significantly interfere with 
their research, science's objectivity would be seriously compromised, as the history of science 
clearly shows. Even social and human sciences, which concern human behavior, should not, as 
sciences, be guided by ethical criteria. At the very least, it would be totally unacceptable to deny 
the competence of a scientist who has scientifically established or documented a fact, on the 
ground that knowledge of this fact might be morally undesirable. Similarly, applied sciences and 
technologies are oriented towards efficiency and control. An engineer will be praised as 
successful for improving techniques that permit the attainment of a given goal. Insofar as it is a 
matter of competence, such a judgment should depend on the difficulty of the problem and on 
the ingenuity of the solution, but not on the ethical merit of the goal. When engineers work with 
architects, it is normally the latter and not the former who are responsible for ethical choices. 
This is not to deny that ethical questions raised by applied sciences and technology are seen as 
highly important to those involved in these disciplines. It is even reasonable to say that scientists 
and engineers should consider that it is their duty to refuse contributing to the development of 
sciences whose applications would be judged by them deleterious to humanity, as illustrated by 
the ethical debates concerning scientists involved in the development of nuclear armaments or in 
human cloning. The point is that these ethical problems are external to science and to technology 
in the sense that the ethical merits of those who contribute or refuse to contribute to enterprises 
that may have moral consequences for humanity have nothing to do with the scientific quality of 
their achievements. Like most problems dealt with by bioethics, such problems are external to 
science and concern many, including scientists as citizens and human beings rather than as 
scientists. It is true that sociologists may be totally devoted to solving problems raised by social 
conflicts in such a way that the success of their scientific enterprise may depend on their ability 
to solve ethical problems associated with this conflict. Can we say that, in this case, we face 
ethical problems internal to science as is the case with architects? Like the architect, the 
sociologist cannot, without discrediting himself, invoke incompetence in solving such ethical 
problems. One may observe that solutions proposed by different sociologists differ radically, but 
the same is true with solutions offered by different architects. Nonetheless, it would be pointless 
to claim that the ethical problem concerning sociologists is internal to sociology because, by 
hypothesis, such problems are not raised by the practice of sociology, whereas ethical problems 
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faced by architects have much to do with the very practice of architecture. Scientists may devote 
themselves to solving many types of problems, including ethical problems, but the question 
discussed in the present paper concerns only the ethical problems raised (at least partially) by the 
practice of disciplines such as biology, medicine, physics, engineering, sociology, painting or 
architecture. Only in this context is it meaningful to distinguish ethical problems as either 
internal or external to a discipline. 
 
Let us now consider the case of other arts which is more complex but more instructive. 
Clearly there are some arts — it is surely the case of design — which are so closely related to 
architecture that they are in a relatively similar situation in regards to their relation to ethical 
problems. But what about arts such as painting and literature that, in contrast to architecture and 
design, cannot be considered as primarily responding to the requirements of social life? It is well 
known that many works of art, especially novels and films, have often been evaluated and 
criticized from an ethical point of view. Should we conclude from this that ethical problems 
discussed in such a way are internal to the practice of these arts? Do artists thus have a 
responsibility to provide appropriate solutions to such ethical problems? Since modern 
aesthetics’ beginnings at the end of 18th Century, the more or less standard answer to this 
question has been that, though ethical evaluations of artworks are legitimate and frequently 
useful, they have little or nothing to do with the aesthetic value of these works and consequently 
should not be confused with judgments on artistic achievement as such. Therefore, one might be 
inclined to conclude that the relation of artists to the works they create is similar to the relation of 
scientists to their discoveries: if those works are aesthetically valuable, they should be praised for 
that, but if they raise ethical problems, those problems should be debated and solved outside the 
realm of art as such by all those, including artists qua citizens, who are interested in solving such 
problems. 
 
However, in recent years this standard view has been increasingly challenged by 
theoreticians who, with the help of various arguments, claim that ethics matters in the aesthetical 
evaluation of artworks1. According to ethicism defended by Berys Gaut (Gaut, 1998), it is 
aesthetically essential that artworks suggest a response, and eventually an ethical response, to the 
content they are presenting, and if this response is defective by not being merited, the work itself 
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is aesthetically flawed. According to such a perspective, the novelist or filmmaker who presents 
a narrative that, typically enough, has ethical implications should realize that he (or she) is 
responsible for suggesting an appropriate (and merited) response to the ethical problems 
involved; otherwise the work would be flawed even from an aesthetical point of view. Thus, 
were we to adopt such a view, it would be fair to claim that ethical problems are internal to the 
practice of arts, at least of narrative arts. Similarly, if one concludes with Mary Devereaux  that 
Leni Riefenstahl’s  Triumph of the Will was aesthetically flawed given its wrong political vision 
which, according to her, is intimately linked to its aesthetical value (Devereaux, 1998), one may 
also claim that the ethical problem associated with the political vision of a film is internal to the 
practice of this kind of filmmaking. However, this view is far from being generally accepted. 
Many would acclaim Riefenstahl’s film as an aesthetic masterpiece irrespective of its ethically 
reprehensible vision. Formalism and aestheticism still have many supporters and their views on 
artworks exclude the very idea of internally imposing on artists any kind of ethical responsibility. 
And if we consider other approaches which, in a more moderate fashion, emphasize aesthetics’ 
ethical dimensions, the question of the internality of the ethical problems becomes more 
ambiguous. Noël Carroll’s moderate moralism (Carroll, 1996) underscores the fact that 
appropriate ethical views are required from an audience in order for them to aesthetically absorb 
various works of art, but this fact does not really imply that it falls on artists to provide an 
acceptable solution to ethical problems associated with their work, as it is required from 
architects. 
 
Thus, depending on the theory adopted regarding this question, it seems sensible to claim 
that ethical problems are either internal or external to arts, or at least to narrative arts. Since this 
is not the place to take issue in the debate concerning this delicate question, I will rather claim 
that, in contrast to other arts, it is in a different and more systematic way that ethical problems 
are internal to architecture. This is due to the fact that the solution of such problems is literally a 
constitutive part of practicing architecture. In order to illustrate this, let us note first that it is 
admitted, even by defenders of moralism, that not all artworks are concerned with morality in the 
sense discussed above (see Carroll, 1996, pp. 225-226 and 1998, pp. 352 and 357). Appropriate 
examples of artworks concerned with morality are usually associated with narratives developed 
in novel, drama, film and possibly narrative painting. Abstract paintings and purely musical 
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pieces, for example, have hardly anything to do at least with the kind of moral problems 
encountered in novels and films. But architecture is an abstract art in the sense that, if we put 
aside a few hilarious exceptions, it does not represent or narrate anything, at least in the common 
meaning of representation and narration. If it is nonetheless associated with ethical problems, it 
is because it produces an obligatory framework for social life which it directly influences.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to think that architecture can induce in people various feelings which 
make them more or less pessimistic, oppressed, depressed, revolted and aggressive, or rather 
optimistic, liberated, communicative, peaceful and possibly egalitarist. As we will see, architects 
are sometimes inclined to think that the influence of their building on human behavior and 
human values may go still further. 
 
Certainly, literature and film may have similar effects on their consumers, but only because 
of narratives, whose content can (wrongly or rightfully, as we have seen) be evaluated 
independently from their aesthetic quality, whereas the effects of architecture can hardly be 
evaluated independently from such qualities. After all, criminality and nazism are not directly 
associated with literature and cinema, but problems concerning decent dwellings are directly 
associated with architecture. Therefore, a racist film can be acclaimed as an aesthetic 
masterpiece, at least by those who reject ethicism, whereas it would be much more difficult to 
praise, even aesthetically, an architectural or an urbanistic scheme which through seclusion, 
isolation and compartimentation tends to encourage racism. For the same reason, while it is 
theoretically conceivable that a skillful architect may build, out of sheer perversity, a housing 
scheme which intentionally generates violence, it would hardly be conceivable that such a 
building would ever be considered a great work of architecture.  As we have seen, it is at least 
questionable to  debase a film or a novel's artistic quality simply by claiming that such a work of 
art may provoke pessimistic and other negative sentiments on the part of viewers or readers. 
Who would claim that Kafka is a poor novelist because he wrote novels that may accentuate 
feelings of desperation in some readers? But one can question the quality of an architect whose 
buildings inspire pessimistic sentiments and despair in its users. It is true that Daniel Libeskind's 
Jewish Museum in Berlin and James Ingo Freed's Holocaust's Museum in Washington were 
acclaimed for the pessimistic and dismaying feelings they inspire, but this is because it is 
precisely this kind of impact that is considered ethically appropriate for buildings of this type. 
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Were such museums designed in such a way that they offer a too pleasant experience to their 
visitors, their architects would have been criticized for failing to provoke the appropriate moral 
sentiments. 
 
This peculiarity of architecture is due to its fundamentally functional character. It is true 
that other abstract arts such as music may provoke ethically charged feelings as well, but since 
the primary function of such arts is not to design the obligatory framework in which social life 
takes place, the success of a musical piece, for example, can hardly be so immediately 
determined by its moral impact. Therefore, ethical problems could be said internal to its practice 
only if the intention of the composer is to generate such ethical feelings through music and if the 
fact that the work is praised or blamed depends crucially on the moral feelings it generates. But 
since their works are, more typically, freely chosen to be enjoyed by an audience, artists can be 
praised for producing works which generate whatever kind of feeling (optimistic or pessimistic, 
etc.) that people may choose to experience at appropriate moments in their life. In contrast, since 
they are designing the theater in which social life necessarily takes place, architects have the duty 
to plan buildings which are able to generate feelings that are ethically acceptable. It is in this 
sense that ethical problems are necessarily an internal part of the problems they have to solve in 
order to achieve success in their art. One might maintain that this difference is only a difference 
of degree, but it is an important one, one which allows us to understand the atypical development 
of debates about ethics in architecture. 
 
Therefore, one must acknowledge that, when it comes to characterizing its relation to 
ethics, architecture is in a very peculiar position. Indeed, artists practicing other arts are not so 
directly obliged to concern themselves with ethical problems and scientists involved in pure or 
applied sciences can leave to others the ethical problems raised by their practice. But when it 
comes to architecture, ethical judgments are hardly distinguishable from aesthetical ones. Indeed, 
both kinds of judgment being internal to this art — aesthetical judgments are internal as well, 
since it is obviously architects who must solve the aesthetical problems that architecture raises — 
they must constitute together the basis of a single architectural decision. Moreover, this 
conflation of ethics and aesthetics has often lead architects and architecture theoreticians to 
present as the accomplishment of an ethical duty the endeavor of those architects who 
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spontaneously adapt their work to the aesthetical sensibility of their time. But let us see how this 
particular situation has influenced and even distorted the debates regarding the relation between 
ethics and aesthetics in architecture.  
 
Atypical ethical debates about ethics in architecture 
 
In fact, though it is only since the 19th century that debates involving ethics and aesthetics 
in architecture have become a key issue, architects and theoreticians of architecture have always 
been concerned with the importance of satisfying people's needs in relation to both the ethical 
values and aesthetical standards accepted in their respective communities. Though ethics as a 
branch of philosophy has been solidly established at least since Aristotle, it is not until the 
development of a philosophical aesthetics at the end of 18th century that the question concerning 
the possibility of conflict between these two dimensions would come to occupy a central place in 
the agenda of architectural theoreticians. For mediaeval and Renaissance architects, there was 
apparently no better way of satisfying the ethical values of their respective periods than by 
designing beautiful buildings. However, in the19th century, matters became more complicated. 
Not only were ethics and aesthetics two well developed branches of thought that were often 
characterized by their mutual opposition, but a consequence of aesthetically oriented scholarly 
research was the specification of various styles among which architects were almost obliged to 
choose. In this context, ethical considerations associated with a particular style could be 
confronted with ethical or aesthetical considerations associated with another style. In a period 
described in Britain as the "battle of styles", A.W.N. Pugin, who had recently converted to 
Catholicism, strongly recommended a return to the gothic style, which he believed was more 
inclined to promote moral sentiments compatible with Christian ideals than the classical style. 
However, in his campaign in favor of a more ethically valuable style, one of his most striking 
argument was based on a somewhat aesthetical comparison between the charm of medieval 
architecture and the horror of 19th century buildings. (Pugin, 1969) While claiming that the duty 
of the architect is to promote morality when building the city, Pugin could not dissociate the 
realization of such a program from an endeavor aiming to make the city more beautiful.  
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A further step in this fusion of beauty and morality was taken by John Ruskin, whose 
influence was undoubtedly more considerable. For Ruskin, the link between what is beautiful 
and what is good was reinforced by the quasi identity of these two fundamental values to a third, 
truth, which, according to medieval thinkers, constitutes (with the two formers) the third member 
in a set of three transcendental concepts. Even if truth is just one of the "seven lamps of 
architecture", it occupies a central place in Ruskin's thought. Ruskin was indefectibly and 
viscerally committed to truth because, according to him, deception is inherently sinful. An 
architect who intentionally hides structural supports in order to suggest that a building stands by 
itself when this is not really the case, or who introduces pseudo-supports which do not play their 
apparent role, deceives honest people and, because of this deception, discredits his profession. 
Trompe-l'œil, which was used so extensively by Renaissance and Baroque architects, is harshly 
condemned since it intentionally deceives people. Even pieces of decoration mechanically 
produced are denounced because they are false (and ridiculous) imitations of the fruit of a 
meritorious handicraft labor. However, all of these condemnations derive as much from 
aesthetical as well as ethical principles. For example, in support of his ethical views on the 
structural truth of gothic construction, Ruskin observes that "the beauty of its traceries would be 
enhanced to him [an intelligent observer of a gothic structure] if they confessed and followed the 
lines of its main strength." (Ruskin, s.d., p. 40)  
 
For Pugin and Ruskin, aesthetic values could not be dissociated from ethical ones, because 
these authors were conscious that architecture was transforming the world in which their society 
was evolving. In this context, architects were endowed with the immense responsibility of 
progressively replacing the horrible buildings that accommodated 19th industrial society with a 
world more akin to the gothic spirit, which, in their mind, was associated with honesty, with truth 
and with an exalting beauty. Ethics is not dissociable from aesthetics because ethical problems 
generated by irresponsible architecture must (internally) be solved by architects guided by better 
aesthetic principles. In order to attribute such a duty to architects, it was not necessary, however, 
to reject the 19th century and modernity. On the contrary, most champions of the ethical role of 
architecture were inclined to define the architect's duty as the obligation to express through their 
buildings the spirit of the period in which they live. Eugène Viollet-le-Duc, though as fascinated 
as Ruskin by the virtues of Gothic architecture, was convinced that architects should contribute 
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to the development of a rational architecture appropriate to their own time. Still more 
systematically, modernist architects of the first half of 20th century did not miss an occasion to 
claim that their commitment to the development of an architecture adapted to their time was a 
moral duty. Their rejection of traditional architecture was not a pure matter of taste; it was 
literally an operation of cleaning the architectural world and of improving, by the same token, 
the life of its inhabitants. Other artists such as painters made their way to modernity still earlier 
and surely not with less conviction, but since architects’ commitment to modernity was based on 
an alleged duty to provide a better framework for social life, it took the form of an astonishing 
crusade against anything which was associated with traditional adornment and perceived 
therefore as inimical to authentic values.In 1908, Adolf Loos harshly condemned the lavishly 
adorned architecture of Vienna by claiming that a backward-looking complacency in 
ornamentation is "a crime against the national economy" resulting "in a waste of human labour, 
money, and material" (Loos, 1908, p. 21). The emphasis on the economic aspect of this moral 
crime illustrates fairly well how even an aesthetically elitist architect such as Loos was fully 
conscious that architects were engaged in the socio-economic enterprise of rebuilding a better 
world for an increasing population. And for him, this ethical conviction was not dissociable from 
the idea that architects must live up to the requirements of the period in which they live. The 
excessive expense of adorning buildings, which Loos compared to the primitive custom of body 
tattooing (Loos, 1908, p. 20) was condemned as a mark of historical regression. For a modernist 
such as Loos, modern society is an adult society which should not indulge in such regressive 
practices and should rather devote itself to the construction of a better world for everybody. But, 
for Loos, such an ethical orientation was not dissociable from an aesthetical stand since he 
scorned adorning and tattooing not only for generating irresponsible expenses but also for being 
a manifestation of a poor and childish taste. This explicit association of ethical and aesthetical 
judgments with a philosophy of history based on the idea that Humanity is animated by the 
mission to overcome its own limitations became a trademark of modernist architecture.  
 
During the nineteen twenties and thirties, when socialist utopias exerted in Western Europe 
an attraction not yet tempered by the revelation of the disappointing experiences in the East, 
modernist architects were particularly inspired by their calling to transform and improve the 
social world. After all, they were planners by profession and revolutionary in virtue of their 
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commitment to modernity. The most famous architects of the time, Le Corbusier, Gropius and 
Mies van der Rohe paid at least lip service to socialism at some moment in their career and 
others like Hannes Meyer, Mart Stam and Ernst May overtly embraced it or even became 
communists. Whatever the degree of their socialist involvement, there is no doubt that architects 
of this period were convinced that it was their duty to improve through better buildings the way 
of life of their fellow citizens. Many of them expressed this conviction, but few did so in terms as 
unequivocal as Bruno Taut when describing the improvement of social behavior through 
efficient architecture as the triumph of ethics inseparable from aesthetics:  
If everything is founded on sound efficiency, this efficiency itself, or rather its 
utility, will form its own aesthetic law. A building must be beautiful when seen 
from outside if it reflects all these qualities [...] The architect who achieves this task 
becomes a creator of an ethical and social character; the people who use the 
building for any purpose, will, through the structure of the house, be brought to a 
better behaviour in their mutual dealings and relationship with each other. Thus 
architecture becomes the creator of new social observances. (Taut, 1929, p. 9; 
quoted by Watkin, 1984, p. 40; emphasis added) 
 
According to this modernist view, if architects do indeed have such an important role to 
play in society's improvement, they must avoid being guilty of the sins of their predecessors. Not 
only must they strive to bring about a better built world, free from the encumbering and useless 
elements that handicapped the architecture of the past, but, as educators of the society emerging 
with this new architecture, they must also strive to make the latter perfectly transparent. They 
must avoid deceiving people through artifices of construction, as was so often the case in 
baroque and other classical styles of architecture. Thus, modernist architects gave a second life to 
Ruskin's sense of the association between architectural transparence and morality. It is this view 
that, along with his fellow Masters of the Bauhaus, Marcel Breuer defended in his apology for 
clarity understood as "the definite expression of the purpose of a building and the sincere 
expression of its structure." According to him, "one can regard this sincerity as a sort of moral 
duty [...]" (Breuer, 1962, p. 261, quoted by Watkins, 1984, p. 13). For modernist architects, it 
was self-evident that the improvement of social life "through the structure of the house" required 
that this structure be honestly made visible. One may wonder why a clear expression of the 
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structure of the house has such ethical significance, but for these architects, who were often 
sympathetic to socialism, reacting against the ideology of a bourgeois society in a context where 
any manifestation of this ideology was seen as imposture and treachery, it was important not only 
to liberate the rising working class from the cumbersome traditions of the past but also to let 
clearly see the symbols of this liberation. 
 
However, in these years of High Utopia, the link between the ethical mission of 
architecture and a vision of history which tends to reinforce this mission should not be reduced to 
that based on the socialist convictions of architects of the time. The most influential theoretician 
of architectural modernism, Siegfried Giedion and the most influential historian of architecture of 
the 20th century, Nicholas Pevsner, capitalized on the association between morality and 
modernity to develop a theory of history according to which architects have an "historic mission" 
not only to improve the social world with the help of better buildings but also to reveal to people 
the new possibilities of architecture conceived of as one of humanity's great enterprise. In Space, 
Time and Architecture, the Bible of many modern architects, Giedion devotes a chapter to the 
“demand for morality in architecture” (Giedion, 1982, pp. 291-333).  However, one would be at 
pains to find anything amounting to a discussion of moral principles in this chapter; it is divided 
into two parts, one praising architects such as Van de Velde, Berlage or Wagner who “honestly” 
devoted their lives to introducing new techniques and new visions to architecture and the other 
praising in an equally eloquent manner ferroconcrete!  In the1940s, a period which saw the 
development of abstraction in painting, more than thirty years after the introduction of cubism 
and sixty years after the heyday of impressionism, the fact that, in order to satisfy the desiderata 
of a well-to-do clientele, so many architects were still constructing as their grandfathers did was 
perceived as a treason by those who were engaged in a fight for the acceptance of modernity in 
architecture. The fact that modern techniques of construction (the use of steel structures, large 
panels of glass and reinforced concrete allowing for free planning, unusual shapes, gardens over 
the roof, etc.) had remained for so long unexploited by architects was perceived as a sluggish 
refusal of one’s duty to find the best ethical and aesthetical solutions to the problems raised by 
the modern living. If the moral duty of modernist architects was to transform people's lives by 
way of innovations which made possible the development of a built world that matched the 
development of other sectors of human life, then it was tempting to conclude that it is for 
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architects an ethical duty to make sure that their architecture corresponds to what the period 
requires. It was still more tempting to give to this duty a Hegelian philosophical dignity by 
invoking the necessity for architecture to be an expression of the Zeitgeist, of the “spirit of the 
age” (see Pevsner, 1963, p. 17). 
 
But what of those, such, Charles, the Prince of Wales, who are morally convinced that 
traditional architecture was much more apt than modern architecture to satisfy the real needs of 
the people?  What of those architects, such as Quinlan Terry, who, in spite of what is required by 
the Zeitgeist, build today attractive tenements which look exactly like the architecture that 
flourished three centuries ago? It is to defend their right to ignore and defy the spirit of the time 
that David Watkin wrote his little essay entitled Morality and architecture. It is only the 
unexpected amalgamation of ethics, aesthetics and the theory of history that can explain the fact 
that this book, which, according to its title, addresses — possibly for the first time in so explicit a 
fashion — the fundamental question of the relation between ethics and architecture, bears 
paradoxically much less on ethics than on the philosophy of history.  Throughout his book, the 
author invokes Karl Popper's famous critique of historicism in order to denounce those architects 
and theoreticians who claim that the development of history requires that the work of architects 
comply with the spirit of the time and who blame those who adopt a more personal approach 
instead of obeying the diktat of History (Watkin, 1984, see "Popper" in index). One may feel 
sympathetic to this plea for freedom of design and to this rejection of historicist enslavement, but 
one may nonetheless estimate that ethical problems raised by architecture remain important, 
problems which were virtually ignored throughout the book.  
 
Long before Watkin, Geoffrey Scott, in a chapter entitled "The Ethical fallacy" of his 
classic book The Architecture of Humanism, denounced the Ruskinian moralization of 
architectural choices, which, according to him, should remain purely aesthetical and technical. 
According to Scott, Renaissance and baroque architects merit our admiration precisely because, 
in order to produce their masterpieces, they have ingeniously used trompe-l'œil and similar 
techniques that Ruskin judged so inimical to truth and to morality (Scott, 1974, ch. 5). Faced 
with Watkin's and Scott's understandable recriminations against the negative and paralyzing 
effects of submitting architectural choices to moral criteria, one might conclude than there is no 
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really room for ethics in architecture. But it would be to seriously misunderstand the 
misunderstanding from which this situation results. Scott's appeal to aesthetic values did not 
imply a rejection of ethical considerations in architecture. Rather, he concludes his chapter on the 
ethical fallacy by strongly emphasizing the close relation between ethical and aesthetic values: 
"There is, in fact, a true, not a false, analogy between ethical and aesthetic values: the 
correspondence between them may even amount to an identity". (Scott, 1974, 125) Such a 
conclusion anticipated another reached by Roger Scruton who, by the end of a book whose title 
— The Aesthetics of Architecture — leaves no ambiguity as to where the emphasis is put, draws 
attention to the "deep, a priori, connection between moral and aesthetic understanding" (Scruton, 
1979, p. 252). We have seen that such an apparently paradoxical conclusion can be understood: 
since most ethical problems raised by architecture are internal to this art, in the sense that they 
are nothing but problems that architects must solve in practicing their art, it is almost impossible 
for them to clearly dissociate their aesthetic solutions to artistic challenges from solutions they 
propose to ethical dilemmas. After all, Pugin, Ruskin, Viollet-le-Duc, Loos, Breuer, Pevsner and 
Giedion never doubted that aesthetic considerations were absolutely crucial to architectural 
works. Otherwise, how would it be possible to distinguish architecture from engineering?  
 
It is true that Karsten Harries whose The Ethical Function of Architecture is an impressive 
and long-awaited contribution to the topic, claimed at the outset his opposition to the aesthetic 
approach in architecture, which, according to him, valorizes works of art as "autonomous" 
entities requiring no other justification than the aesthetical pleasure they can provide. (Harries, 
1997, pp. 21-23) More precisely, he denounces the view, which he attributes to Scruton, 
according to which "beauty is understood as the object of a distinctive kind of pleasure" (p. 12). 
However, one can understand that such a charge against the tendency to associate beauty only to 
a "distinctive kind of pleasure" implies that, for its author, a sane aesthetics of architecture should 
never be dissociated from ethical considerations. Construed in this fashion, Harries's approach is 
not so different from Scruton's, in which aesthetics connects to morality in such a way that, for 
him as for Scott, there is a quasi identity between ethics and aesthetics. Thus, the internal 
character of ethical problems in architecture explains the fact that, whether analyzed from 
aesthetical (Scruton) or ethical (Harries) starting points, ethical problems cannot be dissociated 
from aesthetical problems, both of which are internal. 
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Why architecture provokes such atypical ethical debates  
The paradoxical aspect of these ethical debates is that they all bear on beauty, truth and 
historical time much more than on good or on morality. An apparent exception to this trend is 
Harries' claim that art, and especially architecture, has a much more serious function, one that is 
occulted by an aesthetic approach. According to Harries, the highest function of architecture is to 
provide an authentic dwelling to human beings who are so cruelly lacking of such a thing in 
modern times (Harries, 1997, part 3). Moreover, since a dwelling cannot isolate human beings 
from their community without depriving them from an essential means of realization through 
intercommunication, the ethical function of architecture is also to create the conditions of an 
authentic community life (Part 4). There is little doubt that this mission is an ethical one and that 
it is clearly internal to architecture since the latter's success is presented as depending on its 
solution. Biomedical sciences can be successful without needing to solve bioethical problems, 
but if one accepts Harries' views, architecture cannot be considered successful without seriously 
attempting to solve ethical problems. But why are these latter so difficult to solve? It does not 
seem to be because of technical reasons. From an engineering point of view, building houses of 
various types and places allowing a community to come together does not present particular 
technical difficulties.  Modern housing and meeting places may respectively provide efficient and 
structurally resistant shelters and be functionally well adapted to all kinds of human and 
communitarian activities and yet not satisfy Harries' criteria for successful architecture. It is 
worthwhile to note that people who do not feel at home in modern housing schemes having such 
structural and functional qualities, or who tend to desert urban places having similar qualities 
without being sufficiently attractive usually describe such housing schemes and places as ugly; at 
the very least, they will strongly resist any attempt to describe them as beautiful. For the same 
reason, to complain that a building is uninspiring is to denounce an architectural failure both 
from an aesthetical and ethical point of view. A painting or a drama may be considered a 
masterpiece of great beauty even if it provokes discomfort in its spectators, but a building may 
hardly be considered beautiful if it produces the same result. In contrast, a house in which one 
feels at home because its details as well as its global arrangement are harmonious and well 
thought out will be spontaneously characterized as beautiful. It is not certain that such a house 
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would meet all of Harries' requirements for successful dwellings, but such an aesthetical 
appreciation would not be unrelated to his ethical quest. Be that as it may, what this situation 
illustrates once more is that, despite Harries' objections against aesthetics, solving ethical 
problems in architecture is not separable from solving aesthetical problems.   
 
This is not to say that it is impossible to isolate the ethical problems raised by architecture. 
Most architectural decisions affect the lives of many people, and as such imply a choice among 
ethical values.  Should the architect build houses that open on to public spaces or rather increase 
the intimacy of family life by reducing and concealing such openings? Should an architect 
enhance secrecy and individualism inside a dwelling or favor a family's collective life by way of 
large living and dining rooms? Should the shapes and the colors of buildings such as churches, 
schools and hospitals awake sentiments of joy or invite profound meditation? Should libraries be 
conceived of as austere temples devoted only to scholarly research or be designed as attractive as 
possible in order to incite people from any educational background to use them? All these 
questions have clear ethical implications, but responses may be considered architectural only if 
they satisfy aesthetical requirements as well. For example, the abstract decision as to whether a 
library should be open to the general public or to scholars concerns librarians, civil servants and 
politicians; but the decision as to whether such or such a shape or partitioning of spaces is 
aesthetically attractive in a way that satisfies the ethically oriented demands of one or many types 
of users is an architectural decision. One might even say that a solution that, while complying 
with structural, functional and other requirements, attracts through aesthetical means as many 
types of users as possible is a solution that bears the mark of a great architectural achievement. If 
Alvar Aalto, for example, has literally reinvented this kind of building with his marvelous and 
unique libraries built in various towns of Finland, in Wolfsburg, Germany and in Oregon, it is 
because he found aesthetically attractive solutions to the ethical problems that library raises. But 
this is just one among numerous architectural achievements whose merit is due to the aesthetical 
quality of the solution provided to ethical problems. 
 
The drift in debates on architectural ethics towards the philosophy of history can also be 
explained on this basis. By its very nature, modern aesthetics is always renewing itself. What is 
considered an aesthetic achievement in painting must be in some way different from what has 
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been accomplished up to now. Who would see a beautiful impressionist landscape painted today 
as a masterpiece of painting? From an aesthetic point of view, a painter who does not explore 
new avenues and reveal new possibilities is of little merit. Since architecture is, like painting, an 
art, it is tempting to expect of it that it too explore new avenues. Moreover, the fact that the 
potential development of this art is closely related to the exponential development of technology 
accentuates this expectation. It is not so clear that, from a purely ethical point of view, new 
avenues must be explored in architecture, but, if it is true that, for an architect, ethical 
problems cannot be separated from aesthetical problems, one is tempted to conclude that the new 
aesthetic possibilities discovered by an innovative architecture are also those which are the most 
likely to satisfy humanity's ethical needs. It is only a short step from here to conclude that 
architects have the duty to express the spirit of their time. This step was taken by most modernist 
architects and by those, such as Giedion and Pevsner, who developed, on this basis, a progressive 
philosophy of the history of architecture. It is that philosophy of history that Watkin has 
systematically denounced in a book allegedly devoted to morality and architecture (Watkin, 
1984, especially, part II,2 and part III).   
 
However, the "quasi identity" of aesthetics and ethics in architecture is not a true identity. It 
is in reality just another way to emphasize the fact that ethics, as well as aesthetics, is internal to 
architecture. If such is the case, for ethical problems, being "internal" implies that they must be 
solved by architectural decisions that at the same time address aesthetical problems. 
Conceptually, both kinds of problems can nonetheless be characterized in quite different terms. 
Conceiving of a place which allows people to realize themselves, a place in which people may 
feel at home and which encourages profound interpersonal relations, is not the same as, let us 
say, conceiving of a building which, for whatever reasons, satisfies the senses and the mind. For 
sure, it is theoretically conceivable (and rather probable) that someone may feel fully at home in 
an ugly place or that an aesthetically admirable building may generate negative reactions from an 
ethical point of view. The point is rather that architecture does not consist in providing ugly 
houses for those who might feel happy in them or beautiful objects that are inimical to the values 
of their users. It is true that architects have often failed in their attempts to solve aesthetical 
and/or ethical requirements, but the important point for the present discussion is that, for them, 
aesthetical and ethical problems corresponding to the fulfillment of these requirements could 
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never be solved independently from one another and that this interdependence explains the 
ambiguity and the atypical character of the literature concerning the relation of ethics and 
architecture.  
  
Since architects themselves must solve ethical problems by virtue of their internal 
character, one should not expect from philosophy the keys to their solution. Philosophical ethics, 
whether eudemonist, utilitarian, contractualist or communautarian is not in a position to suggest 
solutions to architects, whose business is to find aesthetical solutions applicable to ethical 
problems. Therefore, the present paper does not try to determine what ethical orientation an 
architect should take; rather, it proposes no more than an analysis of what characterizes 
architecture's ethical problems and of what distinguishes the latter from those encountered in 
other human activities.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 I thanks Michael Levine for drawing my attention to the importance of this literature.  
2 The author would like to thank Michael Levine and Bruce Mann for their very useful comments 
and the SSHRC (Ottawa) for financial support. 
  20 
Quoted works: 
 
Breuer, Marcel (1962), Buildings and Projects 1921-1961, New York, F.A. Praeger. 
Carroll, Noël, (1996), “Moderate Moralism”, British Journal of Aesthetics, 36, pp. 223-238. 
Carroll, Noël, (2000), “Art and Ethical Criticism: An Overview of Recent Directions of 
Research”, Ethics, 110, pp. 350-387. 
Conrads, Ulrich (1970), Programs and Manifestoes on 20th-century architecture, Cambridge, 
MA, MIT Press. 
Devereaux, Mary (1998), “Beauty and Evil: the Case of Leni Riefenstahl’s Triumph of the Will”, 
in Levinson, Jerrold (1998), pp. 227-256. 
Gaut, Berys (1998), “The Ethical Criticisme of Art”, in Levinson, Jerrold(1998), pp. 182-203. 
Giedion, Siegfried (1982), Space, Time and Architecture, The Growth of a new Tradition, 
Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press (first edition: 1947). 
Harries, Karsten (1997), The Ethical Function of Architecture, Cambridge, Mass, M.I.T. Press. 
Levinson, Jerrold (1998), Aesthetics and Ethics, Essays at the intersection, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 
Loos, Adolf (1908), Ornament and Crime, in Conrads,1970, pp. 19-24. 
Pevsner, Nicholas (1963), An Outline of European Architecture, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books 
(first edition: 1943) 
Pugin, A.W.N. (1969), Contrasts: or, A Parallel between the Noble Edifices of the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Centuries and Similar Buildings of the Present Day; Showing the Present 
Decay of Taste (2d ed.), Leicester, Leicester University Press and New York, Humanities 
Press.  
Ruskin, John (sans date), The Seven Lamps of Architecture, New York, John W. Lovell. 
Scott, Geoffrey (1974), The Architecture of Humanism. A Study in the History of Taste, London, 
W. W. Norton & co (first edition: 1914). 
Scruton, Roger (1979) The Aesthetics of Architecture, London, Methuen. 
Taut, Bruno (1929), Modern Architecture, London, The Studio Limited. 
Watkin, David (1984), Morality and Architecture, Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
 
 
